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ABSTRACT 
 
WSN is formed by autonomous nodes with partial memory, communication range, power, and bandwidth. 
Their occupation depends on inspecting corporal and environmental conditions and communing through a 
system and performing data processing. The application field is vast, comprising military, ecology, 
healthcare, home or commercial and require a highly secured communication. The paper analyses different 
types of attacks and counterattacks and provides solutions for the WSN threats. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
WSN is a technology for data processing which has tiny sensor nodes, operating autonomously, 
characterized by strictly guarded computational, power resources and ad hoc environment. It can 
be used for many different applications range armed implementations in the battleground, 
environmental monitoring, in health sectors as well as emergency responses and various 
surveillances. Wireless sensor networks require security mechanisms, as it may interrelate with 
sensitive data and function in antagonistic environments. Due to different constraints of resource 
and computation, security in sensor networks poses numerous challenges. In actuality, it is more 
susceptible to a variety of security intimidation as the freehanded communication medium is more 
vulnerable to security attacks than those of the guided communication medium. 
Security mechanism is necessary for all types of WSN to guarantee the functionality of WSN in 
wicked environment. It is a great challenge due to the restriction of resources in the sensor nodes 
of a WSN.  
The following document has: Section 2 presents a synopsis of the security requirements for WSN, 
Section 3 has attacks/ threats based on potentiality of the attacker, Section 4 consists of the 
attacks/ threats based on the location of the attacker, and Section 5 covers the attacks based on 
protocol layer followed by its counter attacks. Section 6 has different types of attacks are 
compared and followed by conclusions. 
 
International Journal of Ad hoc, Sensor & Ubiquitous Computing (IJASUC) Vol.4, No.6, December 2013 
2 
2. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
The security requirements of a WSN are data integrity, confidentiality and freshness, time 
synchronization, authentication, availability, self organization and secure localization according 
to [1].  
Data integrity ensures that the information do not alter in transfer, either due to accident or by 
malicious intent, as applications for example surveillance based on privacy. Keeping 
confidentiality is done by encryption. Even if data integrity and confidentiality are met we still 
need to send the fresh messages.  
In data freshness, the data should be recent and with no message replayed. To ensure it, a time 
stamp is added to each packet. And also the receiver has to make sure that the data used in 
decision-making process originates from the correct source as WSN sends sensitive data. 
To exchange messages authentication is always mandatory. Sensor nodes are powered by 
batteries and this may run out due to surplus calculation or transmit. This happens when attacker 
jam the link to make sensors busy.  
According to [1], in order to maintain the availability of the network and also to avoid harming 
the operation of the network, security is highly noteworthy. WSN considers every sensor node is 
self-sufficient and supple enough to organize and heal them. Every node does random operations 
so particularly for WSN management no fixed infrastructure is there. WSN should organize them 
to maintain multi-hop routing, carry out key supervision and build conviction among sensors. 
Some applications on sensor network depend on time management. Radio of the sensor should be 
turned off at times to save power. Sensor network always needs accurate information of the 
position so it is easy for an attacker to manipulate sensors to a non-secured location just by 
weakening the signal strengths. 
3. ATTACKS BASED ON POTENTIALITY OF THE ATTACKER 
 
According to [2], there are four types of security threats:  
• Interception: It happens when an illicit party gain right of entry. Attacker is always 
ready to gain illegal access to sensor node. This is a risk to secrecy/confidentiality. 
Example: wiretapping for capturing information from the network.  
• Interruption: It happens when a feature is damaged or not available. This attack is on the 
accessibility of the system. Example: disconnecting the communication, physical capture 
of nodes, insertion of wicked code and corruption of information. 
• Modification: It happens when an unofficial party gains access and mess with the asset. 
It is a threat to integrity. Example: by amending a value in the packets being broadcast / 
causing a DoS attack like down pouring the network with sham. 
• Fabrication: It’s a threat to integrity and authentication. It happens when an illicit bash 
pops in forge object into the system. Here an attacker adds wrong data and negotiate the 
fidelity of the record. Example: adding up of data to a file. 
WSNs are endangered to security attacks because of the broadcast feature of the communication 
means and as well as to the assignment of nodes in an unfriendly or dangerous environment, 
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physically unprotected. Main security attacks based on capability of the network are of two types: 
passive and active attack. 
3.1. Passive Attacks 
The attacker indulges in eaves dropping, monitoring of data transmission. It endeavours to learn 
or to utilize the information from the method but doesn’t affect the resources or do not intend to 
damage other nodes. The attacker aims to obtain information that is in transit, as the term passive 
indicates that the attacker does not attempt to perform any modifications to the data. The 
following methods can be used: 
• Traffic Analysis: To facilitate an adversary just to harm the sensor network or to analyse 
the communication patterns, sensor activities needs to reveal adequate information [3]. 
• Eavesdropping and Monitoring: Snooping to the data the foe could easily learn the 
communication data. Eavesdropping can act successfully against the privacy shield. The 
control packets which contain more thorough information are reachable through the 
location server [3]. 
• Attacks against Privacy: Through direct site observation much data from networks 
could probably be collected. So the network intensifies the privacy quandary since they 
manage much information available easily through distant access. Hence, foes need not 
be present physically to uphold observation [4]. 
• Camouflage Adversaries: Here a spiteful node can be added as a normal node and then 
these nodes pretend to be a normal node to create an attention to the packets and then 
misroute the packets and thus accomplishing the privacy analysis [3]. 
3.2. Active Attacks 
In this attack spiteful nodes can harm other nodes by creating outage of the network. It involves a 
few alterations of the data or the formation of a fake stream. These attacks cannot be prevented 
easily. Attacks can be sub divided into 4 types: 
• Masquerade: This happens when one unit pretends to be dissimilar unit. Example: After 
valid verification sequence has taken place these sequences can be replaced or captured 
thus allowing an endorsed unit with few privileges to gain extra privilege by mimicking a 
body that has those privileges. Interruption attacks can be called masquerade attacks.  
• Replay: It engages the unreceptive capture of a data unit and its following retransmission 
to fabricate an illicit effect.  
• Modification of Message: It implies some change to the original message and produces 
an unauthorized effect.  
• Denial of Services: Caused by fabrication, it thwarts the normal use and supervision of 
facilities for the communication of data. Denial disables the network, produces 
disturbance of the total network or overloads it with unnecessary data in order to mortify 
the performance. It is difficult to prevent active attack due to the extensive assortment of 
physical and network threats. Here a foe effort to stop authorized client in using services 
of the network. This attack not only meant for the foes to disrupt/ destroy a network but 
also lessen the capability of the network to offer a good service. In different networking 
layers these types of attacks might be performed [4]. 
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4. ATTACKS BASED ON THE LOCATION OF THE ATTACKER 
 
According to [5], attackers can be deployed inside (internal attack) or outside (external attack).  
Based on attackers’ location this section classifies the WSNs' link layer attacks. 
4.1. External Attacker (outsider) 
 
This attack can be defined as a physical one, where the attacker doesn’t have any information 
about the cryptographic internal information of the network. Some of the most common features 
are: 
 
• Mote/Laptop class devices 
• Committed by illegitimate parties 
• External to the network (out of WSN range) 
• Commencing attacks without even being authenticated 
 
Some other effects of these attacks: 
 
• Consumption of resources in WSNs 
• Jamming the entire communication 
• Triggering DoS attacks 
 
4.2. Internal Attacker (insider) 
 
When a valid node of the network act unusually it is considered as an internal attack. It utilizes 
the compromised node to attack the network and can demolish or interrupt the network easily. It 
is one of the foremost disputes in WSNs, having foundation from the inner WSNs and accessing 
all other nodes inside its limit.  
Important goals of these types are: 
• Entrance to WSN codes 
• Entrance to cryptography keys 
• Threat: to the efficiency of the network  
• Partial/total disruption 
• Revealing secret keys. 
 
5. ATTACKS BASED ON THE PROTOCOL LAYER AND ITS 
COUNTERATTACK 
 
Based on protocol layer the attacks on WSN are described below. 
5.1. Sink Hole 
Attack: 
• Scheme: By advertising a foe generates metaphorical sinkhole. Example: high quality 
way to support station. 
• Attacker like laptop class can provide this kind of course linking all nodes to genuine sink 
and after that drop packets selectively. 
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• Almost all transfer is heading to the counterfeit sinkhole. 
• WSNs are highly vulnerable to this attack because of the pattern of the communication: 
Lots of transfer is heading towards sink as like single point of failure. 
Counter Attacks: 
• Use of a typical system which will alert every node so that a pertinent node will not listen 
to the cheating information from malevolent nodes which guide to sink hole.  
• Use of some protocol (cryptographic method with keys) that actually might try to confirm 
the superiority of the route with end-to-end acknowledgements enclosing latency 
information or reliability [6]. 
• It counts the list of suspected nodes, do a graph of Network flow and recognizing a sink 
attack by viewing missing data from an area attacked. This method is based on a CPU/ 
base station [3]. The base station/CPU overloads the network with a request note 
enclosing the IDs of the nodes which are affected. The affected nodes respond to base 
station with a note enclosing their IDs, ID of the next leap and the linked cost. Likewise 
the received information is then used from the base station to build flow graph of the 
network [7]. 
• Another approach is Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) readings of messages. 
The projected solution requests collaboration of some Extra Monitor (EM) nodes rather 
than the ordinary nodes. It uses values of RSSI from 4 EM nodes to decide the situation 
of sensor nodes where the base Station is positioned at origin position (0, 0). This 
information is used as weight from the base station to detect this attack [7]. 
• Another scheme is a mobile agent which is proposed in [6]. It is a self controlling 
program segment. It navigates from node to node while transmitting or computation of 
data. Based on mobile agents a routing algorithm with manifold constraints is proposed. 
It uses mobile agents to collect information of all mobile sensor nodes to make every 
node responsive of the total network so that a valid node will not pay attention to the 
corrupt information from compromised node which heads to sinkhole attack. Using the 
Aglet mobile agent is developed which is proposed in [3]. Aglet, developed by IBM is a 
Java based system. Agents are called aglets here. The system suggests 2 algorithms. And 
they are: Agent navigation algorithm tells how a mobile agent provides information to 
nodes and visits every node and Data routing algorithm tells how a node utilize the 
information of the universal network to route data packets. 
5.2. Hello Flood 
Attack: 
• Many WSNs routing protocols after deployment necessitate nodes to transmit HELLO 
packets, which is neighbor discovery based on radio range of the node. 
• Laptop class attacker can transmit HELLO note to nodes and then promote high-quality 
path to sink. 
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Counter Attacks: 
• This attack can be counteracted by using “identity verification protocol”. It authorizes bi-
directionality of a link with encrypted echo back mechanism even before taking 
consequential action based on a note received over that link [8]. 
• To guard against this, each request (REQ) message advanced by a node is encrypted with 
a code. In tree protocol when 2 sensor nodes share some general secrets then the original 
encryption key is spawned on the way. In this way, a node accessible neighbor can 
decrypt and confirm RREQ message while the foe will not be acquainted with the code 
and will be prohibited from initiation the attack. New key combined with the echo back 
mechanism can guard this attack [9]. 
• Route Error (RERR) message sends by the intermediate neighbor node and the source 
node reinitiates the path discovery process when there is an absence of hello packet 
during the periodical hello interval. In a haphazard manner the hello period values are 
altered and suggest this data to other nodes in network in a tenable manner. This 
categorizes and avoids the flooding attack [10].  
5.3. Worm Hole 
Attack: 
• Scheme: tunnel packets established on one part of the system to another 
• Located in a desired environment, wormhole can entirely mess routing 
• These wormholes can utilize routing race circumstances which occurs when node takes 
routing decisions depending on the primary course advertisement 
• Assailant may sway system topology by conveying routing data to the nodes before it 
would in fact get to them by multi hop routing 
• This may persuade distant nodes that they are very close to the sink. This may also 
headed to sinkhole if node on the other end foes elevated quality way to sink 
• Wormholes may induce 2 nodes that they are neighbors when they are far away from 
each other 
• It can be used in conjunction with sybil attack 
• Encryption alone cannot prevent this attack 
Counter Attacks: 
• To detect and for the solution of this attack, there is a easy exchange of 4 way 
handshaking messages. It is easy to implement and it does not entail any location 
information or time synchronization [9]. 
• Detection can be done on basis of data packet flow. In the proposed journal [11], by using 
network simulator NS2 whose code is written as tcl script this attack detection can be 
implemented. This attack is detected based on packet reception and dropped ratio, and 
also based on throughput. Number of packets is declining exponentially so WSNs can be 
protected by using this technique and this is how the attack can be prevented.  
• In [12], a way out to this attack for adhoc networks where all nodes are ready with 
directional antennas. 
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• For perceiving and shielding against this attack Packet Leash [13] is one of the most 
suitable Method. This method has 2 types of leashes they are Geographic and Temporal. 
Geographic Leashes: All the nodes have a synchronized clock and knows it’s exact 
location. Each node attaches its transmission time and existing position before 
transferring the packet. Receiving node figures out the path/ distance and also calculates 
the time for the packets to reach. To guess whether the predictable packet passed through 
wormhole or not, distance information can be used. Temporal Leashes: Here the 
correspondent puts the sending time with the packet and then the receiving node 
calculates the distance/ path of that packet by pretentious promulgation and exploiting the 
discrepancy between he time to send and receive the packet. This solution necessitates 
synchronization amongst nodes.  
• Contrasting packet Leash, [14] presents SECTOR, it does not demand lock 
synchronization and information of the site. By implementing Mutual Authentication 
with Distance-Bounding (MAD) this attack can be prevented. By using the time of Flight 
and by using 1 bit challenge the prime node observes whether or not the second node is a 
neighbor and also calculates its distance to the second node. 
5.4. Selective Forwarding/ Grey Hole 
Attack: 
• In WSNs multi hop model is widespread 
• Threat: compromised node sends selected packets 
• It is comprehend that nodes authentically send received messages 
• Compromised node may decline to send packets, nevertheless neighbors might establish a 
different course 
Counter Attack: 
• this attack can be alleviated using multipath routing with amalgamation with random 
choice of trail to destination 
• Additional solution is to check whether that the neighbor node sends the messages or not. 
The use of watchdog can prevent this attack 
• According to [15], a distributed lightweight defense scheme in opposition to selective 
forwarding attack utilizes by the fellow nodes to supervise the broadcasting of the event 
packet and detect selective forwarding attack by monitoring packets forwarding of two 
nodes in the transmission path and send again these packets plunged by the attackers. 
Event packet is forwarded according to the routing calculated by the routing algorithm 
(OPA_uvwts) from source to destination. The transitional node is accountable for sending 
the event packet. Monitor node is accountable for the detection of probable selective 
forwarding attack and if this attack is identified, it resends event packet to the destination 
node and finally sends a disturbing message to its neighbor to notify the site of the foe 
and thus evade the attacker node in forwarding the incoming packets.  
• In the same paper [15], they have mentioned chronological mesh test based selective 
forwarding attack detection scheme which is centralized to prevent this attack. Its works 
for cluster based sensor networks. These WSNs node sends the details of the packet drop 
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through another pathway to cluster head if it doesn’t see the send message from the next 
hop sensor node in an eternal interval. Cluster head runs this detection scheme of 
sequential mesh test against the apprehensive node just after receiving the drop report of 
the packet. Then sequential mesh test, according to the paper [17] instead of regulating in 
advance the total times of test extort a small samples to run the test. After testing the 
small sample it decides whether to continue the test or not. To detect selective forwarding 
attack WSNs nodes should listen to the network after forwarding the data packets. If the 
sender hasn’t experiment the send message after a certain time then it can be suspected 
that the packet of the transitional relay node has been dropped. Then the sender node will 
report the event of the packet dropping to the cluster head through another course. 
According to [18], this scheme depends on the sequential mesh test which is hypothesis 
test and depending upon the ratio of packet drop the cluster head decides that the 
particular node launching selective forwarding attack or not. But the accurate ratio of the 
detection scheme becomes satisfactory when the package drop rate elevates the normal 
rate. 
• In [19], a routing algorithm of AODV has been proposed to preserve the attack. The 
primary phase of this algorithm is “Counter threshold” and it utilizes the packet counter 
and the detection threshold to recognize the attacks. Second phase is “Query based” and it 
uses acknowledgment from the intermediate nodes to find out the attacker.  
• When the presence of a spiteful node is detected by the algorithm then the primary node 
call upon the second phase- Query Based algorithm. Here the primary node will inquire 
the intermediate nodes about the value of the received packet. If all the intermediate 
nodes are queried together then it will augment the overhead of the algorithm. So to give 
better performance, counter frequency should be used to select the intermediate nodes. 
And thus it will be easier to select the attacker.  
5.5. Acknowledgement Spoofing 
Attack: 
• Link layer acknowledgments is used by the routing protocols 
• Objective: it is convinced that whether a fragile link is strong or a quiet node is alive or 
not 
• A foe may spoof ACKs (acknowledgement) 
• Accordingly fragile link may also be selected for routing 
• Packets forwarded trough that link may be lost/ corrupted. 
Counter Attacks: 
• This attack can be prohibited via good encryption and authentication techniques for 
communication. Since the base stations are reliable so a foe may not be able to spoof 
broadcast/ flooded messages from any base station. This necessitates asymmetry wherein 
no node should be able to spoof any message from base station; at the same time all the 
nodes should be able to authenticate them. Genuine broadcast is functional for the 
interactions of restricted node. This attack occurs on link layer of WSNs. This attack is 
possible on hierarchical routing protocol; location based and QoS aware routing 
protocols, Network flow. 
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• Based on [20], SNEP, TESLA, Random key distribution are the security schemes. 
5.6. Sybil 
Attack: 
• Scheme: a single node acts to be present in another part of the network.  
• It affects geographical routing protocols mostly. 
Counter Attacks: 
• Trusted certification has the probability to eliminate Sybil attacks [21]. It is cited as the 
common clarification. On the other hand it depends on a centralized authority that makes 
sure each body is assigned to exactly one identity, as specified by owning a certificate. In 
[21], researchers present no other method of guarantying such uniqueness and it is 
performed by manual process. This create a performance bottleneck and costly for a 
large-scale systems. Furthermore to be more efficient the endorsed authority make sure 
the stolen/ lost identities are exposed and revoked. This approach can eliminate the attack 
easily when the performance and security implications are solved. 
• Authors of [22] and [23] proposed testing of IP addresses in different autonomous 
systems. It necessitates heterogeneous IP addresses stops some particular attacks however 
does not dampen other zombie networks and also it put a restriction in the usability of the 
application. 
• A validation technique is also used to avert this attack and also discharge masquerading 
hostile bodies. A local unit may recognize a distant identity based on a fundamental 
authority ensuring a one to one correspondence between a unit and a body and may also 
offer reverse lookup. Individuality may be legalized indirectly/ directly. In direct 
validation: the local unit enquires the fundamental authority to legalize the isolated 
identities. In indirect validation the restricted unit relies on previously conventional 
identities which in turn guarantee the validity of the distant individuality in question. 
• The authors of [11] and [12] proposed PKI (Public Key Cryptography/ Infrastructure) to 
defend against this attack. Various algorithms are proposed by them. In this one central 
authority is responsible for giving certificates to each vehicle. Certificate contains PKI, a 
set of physical attributes of a vehicle. Vehicular PKI is very heavy to deploy due to the 
existence of large number of vehicles by different manufactures and countries. 
5.7. Jamming 
Attack: 
• Scheme: attacker tries to broadcast signal to a base station at the same frequency sub 
band/ band as the transmitter  
• It causes radio interference in the network. It disrupts the radio communication.  
• This attack is used by a laptop which grasps higher energy to upset incessantly the 
network. Also it can be done with a simple node sourcing a partial damage which can be 
also deadly to the WSNs (like random distributed jammed node). 
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• In [24], author presented diverse jamming strategies: constant jamming by emanating 
constantly a radio signal, misleading jamming: by inserting normal packets to the conduit 
without any gap between them, random jamming: where the foe exchanges to save power 
consumption between sleeping and jamming and lastly reactive jamming: which will send 
only when it senses activity of the channel and will stay silent when the channel is 
inactive. 
Counter Attacks: 
• So many solutions were proposed to protect against these attacks. Typical resistance 
involves variations of spread-spectrum communication: frequency-hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS) which includes forwarding data by switching rapidly a carrier sense 
amongst a lot of frequency channels/ code spreading. This technique used in military 
applications due to the complexity and high cost, example MICA2 mote is the only 
sensor which alternates efficiently between 2 frequencies and for every additional 
frequency will require extra processing.  
• According to the paper [24], Nodes can try to map out the jammed area by separating the 
contaminated region. Such a protocol was also presented in paper [25].  
• Channel surfing method is motivated by the frequency hopping modulation which is a 
solution for this attack. The difference with FHSS is that it does not involve a repeated 
transformation of the carrier sense and it functions at the link layer.  
5.8. Tampering 
Attack: 
• Scheme: Foe can control these motes and try to find out perceptive information: secret 
key shared between nodes. 
• It can be classified in 2 classes: invasive attacks, which entail access to the hardware 
apparatus like chips and which require high tech and exclusive apparatus used in 
semiconductor industry, and non-invasive which requires less time and more flexible. 
• Attack via JTAC1: testing access port (TAP) which enable a foe to control over the 
sensor node.  
• Other attacks via exploiting the Bootstrap Loader (BSL): enables READ and WRITE on 
the micro controller's memory. Foe can also bother the external flash/ EEPROM where 
precious data are stored.  
• Causes the entire scratch to the network services. 
Counter Attacks: 
• A straightforward way to comprehend this attack is to eavesdrop on the conductor wire 
linking between the external memory chips and the micro controller.  
• The authors of [26] presented a new key management protocol detecting the inoculation 
of spiteful nodes in the network. There is no comprehensive solution against these 
attacks. Typical precautions are applied: disabling the JTAG interface or using high-
quality password for the bootstrap loader.  
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5.9. Collisions 
Attack: 
• Scheme: A foe forwards its own signal when it listen a legitimate node transmitting a 
message to make interferences. In theory, causing collisions to 1 byte is sufficient to 
create CRC error which cripples the message. 
• It is similar to the continuous channel attack. A collision is when two nodes effort to 
broadcast on the same frequency and at the same data rate.    
• Due to collision change will occur in the portion of the data so that disparity error 
occurred. The data packet will then be superfluous as invalid. 
Counter Attacks: 
• All countermeasures used against jamming attacks can be applied to these attacks. 
• Error correcting codes is another solution [27] for this attack which is well structured in 
state of affairs where errors occur on an inadequate number of bytes but this solution is 
an expensive one which presents communication overheard and additional processing. 
5.10. Exhaustion 
Attack: 
• Scheme: According to [28], this attack consists in introducing collisions in frames 
towards the end of transmission and force the sensor node to retransmit continuously the 
packets until it is death. This exhaustion attack is launched using an ordinary sensor node 
or by a laptop. 
• This type of attack leads to starvation by continuously sending data or request over the 
channel. 
Counter Attack: 
• Limit the MAC admission control rate so the sensor network ignores excessive requests 
from the adversary and prevent energy loss. 
• Allow a small slot of time for each sensor node to access to the channel and broadcast 
data, so it confines the possibility of long use of MAC channel.  
• This attack has been solved by two other techniques: Rate Limiting and Time Division 
Multiplexing [29]. Rate Limiting by MAC admission controls excessive requests and 
repeated transmission. 
6. A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY OF ATTACKS 
 
The above presented attacks are summarized in table 1, including the attack type, the 
corresponding protocol layer, its characteristics, a possible solution and the damage it may cause. 
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Table 1.  A summary of WSN attacks. 
Attack Layer Features/ 
Characteristics 
Solution Result of the attack 
Sybil Routing 
layer 
Malevolent node 
supposes numerous 
individualities. The 
aim is to fill the 
memory of the 
neighbouring node 
with useless data 
Validation techniques 
is the solution of Sybil 
attacks and it dismisses 
masquerading 
antagonistic entities 
The result of this attack 
can be biased or 
complete degradation 
of the network's 
service, depending on 
the site of the 
commencement of the 
attack. It can overcome 
the redundancy method 
of the distributed 
storage systems 
Sinkhole 
(Blackhole) 
Routing 
layer 
Malevolent node acts 
as a black hole and 
tries to draw all 
probable traffic 
through a 
compromised node 
creating a metaphorical 
sinkhole with the 
adversary at the centre 
Use a quintessential 
scheme which will 
make the entire node 
aware of the entire 
network so that the 
corrupt information 
from malicious node 
will not listen to the 
valid node. To confirm 
the quality of route 
with end-to-end 
acknowledgements 
some protocol 
(cryptographic method 
with keys) can be used 
which contains 
reliability or latency 
information 
Creates a 
blackhole/sphere of 
influence in the sensor 
network 
Hello flood 
attack 
Routing 
layer 
It uses HELLO packets 
as a warhead to 
persuade the WSNs 
sensors. Protocols 
depending on the 
localized information 
swaps between 
adjacent nodes for 
topology upholding or 
flow control are also 
area under discussion. 
It can also be thought 
of as one-way, 
broadcast wormholes. 
Hello flood attack can 
be counteracted using 
“identity verification 
protocol”. This 
substantiates bi-
directionality of the 
linkage with encrypted 
echo-back mechanism, 
prior to captivating 
meaningful action 
based on a message 
received over that 
connection. 
Every node thinks that 
the attacker is within 
one-hop radio 
communication range. 
If the attacker 
subsequently 
advertises low-cost 
routes, nodes will 
attempt to forward 
their messages to the 
attacker. 
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Worm hole 
attack 
Routing 
layer 
Malicious nodes 
eavesdrop the packet and 
can tunnel messages 
received in one part of the 
network over a low 
latency link and 
retransmit them in a 
different part. It can be 
used to exploit routing 
race conditions. 
To detect and for the 
solution of this attack, 
there is a simple four-
way handshaking 
messages exchange. 
Use of private channel 
can be another solution 
of Worm hole attack. 
Routing race 
conditions 
characteristically occur 
when a node takes 
some action based on 
the first example of a 
message it receives and 
afterwards ignores later 
instances. The goal of 
this attack is to 
challenge cryptography 
protection and to 
confuse sensor’s 
network protocols. 
Selective 
Forwarding 
attack 
Routing 
layer 
Malicious nodes 
forwards most 
messages and 
selectively drops, 
which means throwing 
away some of the data 
 
To select different 
paths randomly toward 
destination, we can use 
multipath routing .The 
probability of message 
that will encounter an 
adversary along all 
routes decreases by 
this one. Another 
solution is we can use 
by forwarding message 
toward neighbors that 
can be done by the 
monitor nodes. 
Watchdog can be used 
as a supervisor of the 
system. 
The result will be a 
total broken of all 
service offered by the 
network 
Acknowledg
ement 
spoofing 
 
Routing 
layer 
Due to the inherent 
broadcast medium, an 
adversary can spoof link 
layer acknowledgments 
for ‘‘overheard’’ packets 
addressed to 
neighbouring recursively 
with each node marking 
its parent as the first node 
from which it hears a 
routing update. 
The most obvious 
solution to this 
problem would be 
authentication via 
encryption of all sent 
packets 
It creates routing loops, 
attract or repel network 
traffic, extend or 
shorten source routes, 
generate false error 
messages, partition the 
network, increase end-
to-end latency 
Jamming Physical 
layer 
Malicious node tries to 
transmit signals to the 
receiver at the same 
frequency band or sub 
band as the transmitter 
uses and causes 
interference 
To mitigate Jamming 
evolutionary algorithm,  
 the ant system, 
Symmetric encryption 
algorithm, Brute force 
attacks against block 
encryption algorithms  
is used. 
The adversary must be 
capable of classifying 
transmitted packets in 
real time, and 
corrupting them before 
the end of their 
transmission. The 
increased noise floor 
results in a flattered 
signal to noise ratio, 
which will be indicated 
at the client 
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Device 
Tampering 
Physical 
layer 
The simplest way to 
attack is to damage or 
modify sensors 
physically and thus 
stop or alter their 
services. Base stations 
or aggregation can be 
attacked as well 
Use Tamper-resistant 
devices, Tamper proof 
systems 
Stop the service of the 
sensors 
Collisions 
attack 
Link 
layer 
Message transmission 
by two nodes on a 
same frequency 
simultaneously 
Use of error correcting 
codes 
It changes packet's 
fields, and also alters 
the acknowledgement 
message 
Exhaustion 
attack 
Link 
layer 
Continuous 
retransmission and 
repeated collisions 
until the sensor node 
becomes dead 
Rate Limiting and 
Time Division 
Multiplexing 
Continuously 
retransmission, 
message modification; 
acknowledgement 
message 
corruption/change  
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the case of WSN, security has been an increasingly significant subject. Due to resource 
limitations, it is quite impossible to provide a strong security to a WSN. In the present paper, 
attacks and defences referenced from 1997 till 2013 have been summarized and particular 
solutions were proposed. As all WSNs attacks and counter attacks have been presented the 
extensive study could offer a review of the relevant topic for future research on WSN security. 
Future work should focus on finding a solution for combinational link layer attacks, designing the 
MAC36 protocol, or securing WSNs links against collision and DoS attacks. More 
comprehensive research is also necessary to measure the efficiency of algorithms in terms of 
resources available.  
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